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Abstract
I study the consumption responses of heterogeneous households following changes
in both house prices and interest rates. I show the common assumption that house-
hold period utility is separable in housing and consumption can be consistent with
the observed co-movement between these two series only in the absence of housing
transaction costs. When these costs are introduced into dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models characterized by separable preferences, consumption no
longer increases after a rise in house prices. As it is well known, transaction costs are
an important ingredient in house sales. I address this issue by developing a model that
allows for non-separable preferences in housing and consumption alongside housing
transaction costs.
The results of my model closely match the aggregate data. Furthermore, it predicts
that credit-constrained households will be substantially more responsive to changes in
both house prices and interest rates than unconstrained households. Following a rise
in house prices, consumption among constrained households increases by far more
than the consumption of unconstrained households. Following a rise in interest rates,
constrained households’ consumption falls by more than that of unconstrained house-
holds. I trace this differing responsiveness in consumption to the house loan-to-value
ratio of credit-constrained households. Higher loan-to-value ratios imply larger differ-
ences in their elasticity of response relative to unconstrained households. I also find
that these differences widen with the degree of complementarity between housing and
consumption. These predictions of my model are confirmed by household data from
the Consumer Expenditure Surveys.
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1 Introduction
A house not only serves as an important asset, but it also is a large component of overall
consumption expenditure. In recent years, researchers have begun to study the role of house
prices in explaining movements in macroeconomic series. I develop a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model that incorporates two key components. The first is
housing transaction costs. The second component is nonseparable preferences over housing
and consumption. Households differ in that unconstrained households are not affected by
their house collateral value, while constrained households are affected by the collateral value
of their houses. Constrained households are assumed to be relatively impatient compared
to unconstrained households.
Complementarity between housing and consumption exists when the elasticity of in-
tratemporal substitution (EIS) is less than unity. In this paper, the EIS is estimated at 0.59
through minimum distance estimation. This finding of complementarity is consistent with
previous finding in NIPA data (Song (2009)), PSID data (Flavin and Nakagawa (2004),
Siegel (2004), and Li, Liu and Yao (2008)), CEX data (Stokey (2007))1, and data from
the Housing Allowance Demand Experiment (Hanushek and Quigley (1980)). Hence, in-
troducing complementarity under nonseparable preferences over housing and consumption
is justified based on the data.
Along with complementarity, proportional housing transaction costs are also crucial in
the analysis of housing and consumption. Eberly (1994) and Lam (1989) show the impor-
tance of transaction costs as a determinant of durable goods consumption. Furthermore,
Grossman and Laroque (1990) argue that transaction costs significantly affect the num-
ber of house sales. They show that a transaction cost that is 5 percent of the value of
the existing house implies an average time between purchases of 20 to 30 years. It fol-
lows that models without transaction costs may not capture an essential aspect influencing
movements in the data, and their predicted price movements may be misleading.
Most of the existing model-based macroeconomic literature rules out the possibility
of complementarity between housing and non-housing consumption by adopting separable
1Using NIPA data from 1970 to 2009, Song (2009) finds evidence at complementarity. Flavin and
Nakagawa (2004) apply complementarity to asset pricing implications. They find that the EIS is less than
one, arguing housing and consumption are not separable in preferences. In fact, they estimate the EIS to be
0.13. Li, Liu and Yao (2008) estimate the EIS at 0.33 through the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM)
using PSID data. Stokey (2007) also estimates the EIS at 0.23 and 0.45 using CEX expenditure data.
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preferences, which are usually based on a log utility function as in Aoki et al. (2004) and
Iacoviello (2005). Elsewhere, Piazzesi et al. (2007) find evidence suggesting that housing
and consumption could be substitutes. They do not directly consider housing, but instead
consider the elasticity of substitution between durable goods and nondurable goods. They
adopt a parameter value ranging in the interval [1.04, 1.43] with 95 percent confidence, as
in Ogaki et al. (1998). However, the estimate of that elasticity of substitution is misleading
about the elasticity between consumption and housing services.2
This paper is related to the seminal contribution of Iacoviello (2005). His analysis of
housing assumes separable preferences between consumption and housing, and abstracts
from housing transaction costs. When housing transaction costs are introduced with sep-
arable preferences into the Iacoviello (2005) model, consumption no longer increases fol-
lowing a rise in house prices. This is inconsistent with the empirical evidence showing a
positive co-movement between house prices and consumption.
Recognizing the importance of both complementarity and transaction costs, I address
this issue by developing a DSGE model that allows for realtor fees and nonseparable pref-
erences over housing and consumption. In my model, transaction costs, complementar-
ity and house loan-to-value ratios drive different consumption responses across credit-
constrained and unconstrained households. Complementarity between housing services
and non-housing consumption makes the model consistent with the co-movement seen in
the data. The transmission mechanism of house prices is as follows. Suppose house prices
rise, this increases both the values of collateral, for credit-constrained households, and net
worth. As a result, spending on an consumption and housing rises. The increase in housing
demand leads to a further rise in house prices. Transaction costs abate this circular process
somewhat. Nonetheless, the fundamental co-movement between housing and consumption
continues to deliver an amplification effect.
I find that constrained households are substantially more responsive to changes in
both house prices and interest rates than unconstrained households. For example, a rise
in house prices increases the consumption of constrained households by far more than
the consumption of unconstrained households. Transaction costs dampen the response
of constrained households to an increase in house prices. Furthermore, following a rise
in interest rates, the consumption of constrained households falls by more than that of
2Song (2009) finds a significant estimate of the housing versus non-housing consumpiton elasticity to be
0.19. This finding of complementarity there is robust to a variety of estimation methods including Dynamic
OLS (DOLS), Canonical Co-integrating Regression (CCR) and Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS).
3
unconstrained households. This difference in the responsiveness of consumption is driven
by the house loan-to-value ratio characterizing credit-constrained households. Higher loan-
to-value ratios imply larger differences in the consumption response across constrained and
unconstrained households.
Stronger complementarity also widens the gap between the consumption responses
across the two groups of households. A rise in the interest rate leads constrained house-
holds to further decrease contemporaneous consumption. Higher house loan-to-value fur-
ther magnifies the effect of changes in interest rates, so that the real economy becomes
more volatile with respect to house prices and consumption. I confirm these predictions of
my model using household data from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In section 2, I provide a set of empirical regu-
larities regarding house prices and the demand for consumption goods and housing. There,
I document the positive correlation between house prices and consumption that I seek to ad-
dress. Next, in section 3, I construct a DSGE model allowing for both housing transaction
costs and nonseparable preferences over housing and non-housing consumption. In section
4, I calibrate my model using long-run average and shares of macroeconomic series. Next,
I estimate the structural parameter governing the consumption-housing elasticity using a
minimum distance method that minimizes the difference between impulse responses from
the model versus the data. Results are presented in section 5 and section 6. There, I show
that my model generates time series consistent with those in the data. I also evaluate my
model’s comparative statics predictions regarding house loan-to-value ratios and housing
transaction costs. I show that, following an increase in the interest rate, higher loan-to-
values lead to more volatile responses in both house prices and consumption. Section 7
concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
In 2007, the value of real estate in households amounted to over $20 trillion, which
is 1.4 times greater than nominal annual gross domestic product (GDP). The mortgage
related market, totaling $8.6 trillion in 2007, has grown aggressively to become a dominant
component of financial markets since 1997. New issuance of mortgage related securities
amounted to over $2.1 trillion, which is 272 percent of outstanding Treasuries and 180
4
percent of the corporate bond market.3
Throughout the post-war period, US house prices, residential investment and GDP have
co-moved. Figure 1 shows the co-movement of house prices, consumption and residential
investment. At the period of each recession, all variables tend to move downward together.
Residential investment is very volatile. In particular, residential investment is severely
affected during a recession. In 2005, the contribution of residential construction to GDP
was 6.3 percent; by 2009 this had fallen to 2.4 percent.4
Figure 1: Co-movement of Housing Prices, Residential Investment and Consumption
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In Figure 2, I examine the direct relationship between house prices and consumption
using a scatter-plot of de-trended personal consumption expenditure (PCE) and de-trended
house prices (CMHPI). The data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and
Freddie Mac, and covers the 1970 to 2009 period. I use an HP-Filter to de-trend the data.
The correlation between house prices and consumption is 0.42. As house prices increase
(decrease), households are more (less) likely to consume. Given the positive correlation
3These observations are drawn from SIFMA data, which is available at:
www.sifma.org/uploadedF iles/Research/Statistics/SIFMAUSBondMarketOutstanding.pdf
4See “The recession and the Housing Drag” in Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2010.
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between house prices and both consumption and residential investment (housing demand),
housing and consumption appear to move as complements.
Figure 2: Scatterplot of Detrended CMHPI against Detrended PCE
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Houses are different from other durable goods in several important respects. First,
changes in housing stocks incur substantial transaction costs proportional to house values.
Second, the average housing depreciation rate (1.6 percent) is very small compared to the
depreciation rates of other durable goods (averaging 21 percent). Third, with a required
down payment, houses are highly leveraged. Fourth, house values are three times as big
as all other durable good stocks. Fifth, houses perform a dual role; they are both an
investment asset and a shield against fluctuations in stock prices.5 In the section below, I
develop a model that captures these special qualities unique to housing.
3 The Model
The economy is populated by unconstrained households, constrained households, en-
trepreneurs, retailers and the central bank. Households are heterogeneous in that un-
5Robert B. Couch(2004) examines the correlation between house prices and stock returns and finds that
it is relatively low
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constrained households are unaffected by their collateral, provide loans to constrained
households, receive lump sum profits from the ownership of retail firms and accumulate
realtor fees. Constrained households are affected by house collateral, receive loans from
unconstrained households and they are assumed to be relatively impatient in compari-
son to unconstrained households. Since proportional transaction costs come from realtor
fees, constrained households and entrepreneurs have to pay transaction costs to uncon-
strained households (realtors), whenever there are housing transactions. Entrepreneurs
produce intermediate goods using labor, houses and capital as inputs. Retailers, who buy
intermediate goods from entrepreneurs and sell final consumption goods to households,
are monopolistically competitive and have infrequent opportunities to adjust prices. The
central bank takes the nominal interest rate as a policy instrument. Monetary policy is
assumed to follow a Taylor rule responding to past inflation and past output.
The model in this paper follows the same structure as Iacoviello (2005). However,
it differs in two crucial ways. First, the household utility function is not separable in
housing and consumption. Introducing nonseparable preferences is a critical extension to
the analysis of housing in macroeconomics. Complementarity in preferences is suggested
by both micro and macro data. Second, introducing housing transaction costs leads to
important changes given the nonseparable utility function. Transaction costs reduce the
effect of house prices on consumption.6
In this paper, housing transaction costs proportional to the sale price of houses are
introduced into the budget constraints of households and entrepreneurs. Housing transac-
tion costs capture two important facts. First, new house purchases heavily depend on the
sale of existing housing. These purchases are associated with realtor fees. Second, realtor
fees reduce the effect of changes in house prices on consumption. As a result, transaction
costs can dampen movements in house prices. In fact, introducing transaction costs moves
the model closer to the data, as will be shown in section 5 and 6.
3.1 Unconstrained Households
Unconstrained households receive utility from consumption and housing services de-
rived from the quantity of housing stock they hold. They also provide labor for production.
Their preference for consumption and housing services is represented by a time separable
6Furthermore, transaction costs are important determinants of durable good consumption (Eberly
(1994)) and (Ogaki and Reinhart (1997)).
7
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function. Unconstrained households max-
imize the following objective function:
max
{b1,tC1,t,H1,t,N1,t}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
β1
t 1
1− ς
[{
C
ε−1
ε
1,t + jt(H1,t)
ε−1
ε
} ε
ε−1
]1−ς
− N
η1
1,t
η1
 , (1)
where E0 denotes the expectation operator.
7 C1,t denotes nondurable consumption. H1,t
denotes the stock of housing.8 The discount factor β1 for unconstrained households is
assumed to be greater than that of constrained households, or 0 < β2 < β1 < 1. The
parameter ε is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between housing and nondurable
consumption. As long as ε is less than one, housing and consumption are complements.
The parameter ς is the curvature of the utility function, which can also be interpreted as
the households’ coefficient of relative risk aversion. Households allocate their time between
labor hours, N1,t and leisure, L1,t. Their endowment of time is one, hence N1,t + L1,t = 1.
I also assume that the housing demand shock, jt, follows the stochastic process:
ln jt =
(
1− ρj
)
ln j¯ + ρj ln jt−1 + εj,t, (2)
where j¯ > 0, ρj ∈ (−1, 1) measures the persistence of the shock, and εj,t is independent
and identically distributed i.i.d. ∼ N
(
0;σ2j
)
with mean zero and variance σ2j .
Each period, unconstrained households choose a level of nondurable consumption,
houses and hours of work, given the period budget constraint. The budget constraint
is given by
PtC1,t + (H1t −H1t−1)Qt +Rt−1B1,t−1 + ϕ1QtH1t−1 = W1,tN1,t +B1,t + Ft + St.
Households begin with a stock of housing, which has the nominal market value of H1t−1Qt.
They also receive lump sum profits, Ft, from the ownership of retail firms, and nominal
realtor fees, St, from constrained households and entrepreneurs. St follows
St = ϕeQtHet−1 + ϕ1QtH1t−1 + ϕ2QtH2t−1,
7Throughout the paper, the subscripts 1, 2, and e refer to unconstrained households, constrained house-
holds, and entrepreneurs, respectively.
8Housing services are assumed to be proportional to the stock of housing.
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where ϕ1 is zero because unconstrained households are realtors, while ϕe and ϕ2 denote
realtor fees, which are proportional to the sale value of houses. I assume that uncon-
strained households lend in nominal terms, -B1,t. In return, they receive nominal amount
of Rt−1B1,t−1. Rt−1 is the nominal interest rate. It is assumed that houses do not depre-
ciate. Using a numeraire Pt, we can obtain the real budget constraint from the nominal
budget constraint above:
C1,t + (H1t −H1t−1) qt + Rt−1
pit
b1,t−1 + ϕ1qtH1t−1 = w1,tN1,t + b1,t + ft + st, (3)
where w1,t is the real wage households earn from their labor supply, qt is the real house
price, and pit denotes inflation, or pit =
Pt
pt−1 . Since the nonseparable utility function is
associated with transaction costs, the curvature, ς, can be greater than, equal to or less
than the inverse of the marginal rate of intertemporal elasticity of substitution. I define the
curvature of the utility function as ς = 1σ . When ε is equal to σ, the utility function becomes
separable. When the limit is taken as ε goes to one, the utility function becomes the Cobb-
Douglas specification. The household optimization problem is to choose b1,t, C1,t, H1,t, and
N1,t to maximize (1), subject to constraints (2) and (3).
The first order conditions lead to the following two optimality conditions are derived:
1 = Et
(
UC1,t+1
UC1,t
β1Rt
pit+1
)
, (4)
where UC1,t =
{
C
ε−1
ε
1,t + jt(H1,t)
ε−1
ε
} σ−ε
σ(ε−1)
C
−1
ε
1,t , and
UH1,t
UC1,t
= qt (1 + ϕ1)−
(
pit+1
Rt
)
qt+1, (5)
where UH1,t =
{
C
ε−1
ε
1,t + jt(H1,t)
ε−1
ε
} σ−ε
σ(ε−1)
(H1,t)
−1
ε jt. Equation (4) is the standard Euler
equation. The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, weighted by the nominal in-
terest rate and discounted by β1 equals one. Equation (5) determines the marginal rate
of substitution between housing and consumption. These two equations can be combined
into
C1
H1
= (qt)
ε
(
(1 + ϕ1)
jt
− pit+1
jtRt
qt+1
qt
)ε
. (6)
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Equation (6) gives the optimal ratio of consumption to housing, which is related to house
prices, transaction costs, housing demand shocks and the nominal interest rate. The higher
the interest rate is, the greater consumption rises relative to housing, because houses are
more sensitive to the interest rate. The higher the positive housing demand shock is, the
less consumption relative to housing is likely to be, because housing is more valuable.
3.2 Constrained Households
The optimization problem for constrained households is
max
{b2,tC2,t,H2,t,N2,t}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
(β2)
t 1
1− ς
[{
C
ε−1
ε
2,t + jt(H2,t)
ε−1
ε
} ε
ε−1
]1−ς
− N
η2
2,t
η2
, (7)
subject to
C2,t + Ih2t +
Rt−1
pit
b2,t−1 = w2,tN2,t + b2,t, (8)
where
H2t = qtH2t−1 + Ih2t − ϕ2qtH2t−1
and
Rtb2t ≤ m2Et (qt+1pit+1H2t) . (9)
For constrained households, housing transactions incur realtor fees, ϕ2qtH2t−1. The trans-
action costs are proportional to the value of house sales and are paid to unconstrained
households. Since it is assumed that constrained households discount the future more heav-
ily than unconstrained households, equation (9), which represents the collateral constraint,
binds. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), when debtors default on obligations, creditors
repossess houses by paying (1 − m2)βqt+1pit+1H2,t. Hence, (1 − m2) can be interpreted
as a down-payment ratio. The loan-to-value ratio is denoted as m2, where 0 ≤ m2 ≤ 1.
Liquidation, however, takes times and bears costs. The collateral constraint implies that
mortgages cannot exceed the house value. I assume that the housing demand shock, jt,
is common to both unconstrained households and constrained households following the
stochastic process.
The first order conditions imply the following Euler equation and housing price equa-
10
tion:
UC2,t = Rtλ
m
2,t + UC2,t+1
Rt
pit+1
β2, (10)
qt =
UH2,t
(1 + ϕ2)UC2,t
+
β2 (1− δh2)
(1 + ϕ2)
(
UC2,t+1
UC2,t
)
qt+1 +
λm2,t
UC2,t
m2tEtqt+1pit+1
(1 + ϕ2)
, (11)
where UC2,t =
{
C
ε−1
ε
2,t + jt(H2,t)
ε−1
ε
} 1−σε
ε−1
C
−1
ε
2,t , and UH2,t =
{
C
ε−1
ε
2,t + jt(H2,t)
ε−1
ε
} 1−εσ
ε−1
(H2,t)
−1
ε jt.
λm2,t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint. House prices de-
pend on ε, σ, and housing demand preferences. Composition risks, which are ratio fluctu-
ations in the share of housing to consumption affect house prices. Consumption risks are
also associated with house prices. The realtor fee rate, ϕ2, affects house prices negatively.
When ε rises relative to σ, households are more willing to substitute housing services and
nondurable consumption within a period than they are to substitute overall consumption
between the periods. When ε is equal to σ, house prices purely are related to composition
risk and consumption risk. House prices in the steady state satisfy
q =
j
(1 + ϕ2)− β2 − (β1 − β2)m2
(
C2
H2
) 1
ε
. (12)
The house price depends on the housing demand shock, transaction costs, loan-to-values,
and the ratio of consumption to house. Complementarity9, ε, is also an important element
in determining asset prices. The denominator implies the average of discount factors across
unconstrained households and constrained households. House prices increase when house
loan-to-value m2 increases and when the realtor fee ϕ2 decreases, ceteris paribus. When
the transaction costs are equal to zero, house prices are determined by the discount factor,
consumption share to houses and ε. From the budget constraint, net worth is used to
finance the difference of new debt and the next unit of house. Selling one’s existing house
affects their net worth, which is used to purchase new stock of houses. The difference
between the price of new house and net worth is the households’s new debt. Hence, houses
for constrained households satisfy,
H2,t =
1
Et
(
qt − m2qt+1pit+1Rt
) (qtH2,t−1 − Rtb2,t−1
pit
)
. (13)
9Since in this paper, the elasticity of intratemporal substitution, ε, is estimated at 0.592, it can be
interpreted as complementarity.
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This equation is consistent with the result of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). As the loan-to-
value, m2, rises, house prices increase. This occurs because a higher loan-to-value results
in higher housing demand. As house prices rise from both date t and t + 1, the current
net worth, qtH2,t−1 − Rtb2,t−1pit , and the collateral value,
qt+1pit+1
Rt
, increase, which induces
an increase in housing demand. The extent to which houses can be used as collateral
determines how much the conventional law of demand is overturned. In fact, an increase in
house prices induces a rise in housing demand through the collateral effect. For the extreme
case of no collateral value, or zero loan-to-value, there is a trade-off relationship between
house prices and house quantity demanded. As long as the loan-to-value is positive, house
prices are positively related to house quantity demanded.
Equation (13) implies the transmission mechanism of house prices to macroeconomic
fluctuations. Suppose house prices rise. Overall, a rise in house prices increases borrowing
capacity and net worth. Housing and consumption are boosted because of heightened
collateral values and net worth. In turn, higher housing demand further increases house
prices. The change in housing net worth is associated with a high leverage effect, measured
in the loan-to-value, which makes net worth much higher relative to a required down
payment. Indeed, leverage plays an amplifying role in net worth.10 The converse holds
when there is a decline in house prices. As the leverage ratio rises, it decreases net worth.
Households may default due to negative equity. Housing and consumption can shrink
because of tighter borrowing constraints, as a fall in collateral values, and net worth,
further depresses housing and consumption. Therefore, changes in house prices amplify
fluctuations in macroeconomic variables.
3.3 Entrepreneurs
The Entrepreneurs derive utility only from consumption. They produce intermediate
goods according to the following constant return to scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas production
function with labor, housing and capital as inputs, which can be written as
Yt = Zt
(
Kvt−1H
1−v
t−1
)µ(
Nα1,tN
(1−α)
2,t
)(1−µ)
, (14)
10“The usual notion that a higher land price, qt, reduces the farmers demand is more than offset by the
facts that (i) they can borrow more when qt + 1 is higher, and (ii) their net worth increases as qt rises”
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
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where Yt denotes output and Zt represents productivity in period t. Kt−1 and Ht−1 denote
capital and housing in period t-1, respectively. Furthermore, Kt−1 and Ht−1 are initial
endowments to entrepreneurs. The shock to Zt follows the stochastic process:
lnZt = (1− ρz) ln Z¯ + ρz lnZt−1 + εZ,t, (15)
where Z¯ > 0, ρZ ∈ (−1, 1) measures the persistence of the shock and εZ,t is a white noise
process with mean zero and variance σ2Z . Capital accumulation follows
Kt = (1− δKe)Kt−1 + IKt − ξ
2
(Kt −Kt−1)2
Kt−1
,
where Ikt denotes investment of capital. The parameter ξ denotes convex adjustment
parameter. Capital depreciates at the rate δKe. Housing accumulation follows
Het = qtHet−1 + IHet − ϕeqtHet−1,
where IHet denotes investment of houses. Housing transactions are associated with the
transaction costs like realtor fees, ϕeqtHet−1, which are paid to unconstrained households.
The utility function, budget constraint and borrowing constraint of entrepreneurs can be
represented by the utility maximization problem as follows:
max
{Cet,bet,It,Kt,Ht,N1,t,N2,t}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
γt lnCet, (16)
subject to
Yt
Xt
+ bet = Cet +
Rt−1
pit
bet−1 + w1,tN1,t + w2,tN2,t + Ikt + IHet + ξKt + ξHet, (17)
where
IKt = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 , ξKt = ψK2δ
(
IKt
Kt−1 − δ
)2
Kt−1, IHet = {Het −Het−1} qt,
ξHet = ϕeqtHet−1,
and
Rtbet ≤ meEt (qt+1pit+1Het) . (18)
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There is a proportional housing transaction costs parameter, ϕe, in the budget constraint.
Finally, me is the constant parameter of the loan to value ratio to entrepreneurs.
3.4 Retailers
Retailers as in Iacoviello (2005), which follows Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)
take the same firms. Retailers produce a continuum of differentiated final goods modeled
under monopolistic competition. Since retailers have market power, profits are assumed to
be paid to unconstrained households. The retailers’ supply curve implies a Phillips curve,
determined by an optimal pricing equation. Retail prices are sticky, and the probability
of any retailers being able to adjust its nominal prices is 1 − θ. The retailers purchase
intermediate goods from entrepreneurs with the price of P intert and sell final goods to
households with the price, Pg, where the goods are differentiated on a unit interval. Final
goods are Yt(G) =
(
1∫
0
Yt(g)
(ξ−1)/ξdg
) ξ
ξ−1
with ξ > 1. The solution to the firms’ cost
minimization problem gives a demand function for intermediate goods and a price index,
Pt =
(∫ 1
0 P
inter
t (g)
1−ξdg
) 1
1−ξ
. Profit maximization by each retail firm implies that the
optimal price of final goods,
_
P t(g), satisfies
∞∑
i=0
θiEt
(
β
C1,t
C1,t+i
(
_
P t(g)
Pt+i
− XtXt+i
)
_
Y t+i(g)
)
= 0,
where Xt is the markup. The aggregate price index is Pt =
(
θP εt−1 + (1− θ)
_
P
1−ξ
t
) 1
1−ξ
.
From the optimization of retailers, the aggregate supply curve can be derived as pˆit =
βpˆit+1 − kXˆt + εˆu,t, where k = (1−θ)(1−βθ)θ .
3.5 The Central Bank
The central bank is assumed to follow a Taylor Rule taking the nominal interest rate
as the instrument for monetary policy:
Rt = (Rt−1)γR
(
pi
1+γpi
t−1
(
Yt−1
Yt
)γy
q
γq
t−1
)1−γR
εR,t (19)
3.6 Equilibrium
The dynamic stochastic equilibrium for given He,0, H1,0, H2,0, be,0, b1,0 and b2,0 is
a sequence of allocations, {Yt, Ce,t, C1,t, C2,t, He,t, H1,t, H2,t, be,t, b1t, b2t, N1,t, N2,t}∞t=0 and
a sequence of prices,
{
w1t, w2t, Rt, qt, Pt,
_
P t, λt
}∞
t=0
, which satisfy the budget constraints,
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borrowing constraints and first order conditions for each economy. For the markets to clear,
the bond market for bt, goods market for Yt and the house market for Het , H1t and H2t
should meet the following conditions:
(a)N1t = N2t
(b)He,t +H1,t +H2,t = 1,
(c)Ce,t + C1,t + C2,t + It = Yt,
(d) It = IKt + IHet + IH1t + IH2t,
(e) st = ϕeqtHet−1 + ϕ1qtH1t−1 + ϕ2qtH2t−1,
(f) bt + b1t + b2t = 0
Wages are different across households and based on their productivity. In the steady state,
unconstrained households receive wage bills of w1N1 = α (1− µ− v)Y , while constrained
households receive a wage bill of w2N2 = (1− α)) (1− µ− v)Y . 11
3.7 Solution Method
The solution of the dynamic model involves non-linear equations and identity equations.
The steady state values of the state variables are recovered from a nonlinear system of
equations. This step uses the Broyden method for solving systems of nonlinear equations.
After obtaining steady state values, the model is loglinearized. All derivatives of the
first order conditions are automatically calculated using the Jacobian command in Matlab.
Finally, the Uhlig toolkit is used to solve the linear system of stochastic difference equations.
4 Calibration and Estimation
4.1 Calibration
The steady state value for labor hours for both unconstrained households and con-
strained households is 0.33. The housing preference parameter, j, is set to 0.21 in order to
match the share of GDP. Following Luengo-Prado and Sorensen (2006), and Li, Liu and Yao
(2008), and Stokey (2007), the transaction costs for constrained households is 5 percent.
This is consistent with the data from the Department of Justice in 2009. The benchmark
model assumes a lower level of 3 percent as the transaction cost of entrepreneurs. In the
11All equations are related to the steady state and log-linearization.
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sensitivity analysis, 6 percent for entrepreneurs is also applied. Either 3 percent or 6 per-
cent can be applied without changing results. Also recall that unconstrained households,
as realtors, pay no transaction costs.
The discount factors for unconstrained households, constrained households and en-
trepreneurs, the share of housing to consumption, the parameters of production across
capital and housing, the probability of the price adjustment and the depreciation rate for
housing are the same values as in Iacoviello (2005).
Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Value Data to Match
β ,γ, β2 0.99, 0.98, 0.97 subjective discount rate
j 0.21 share of housing to consumption
ϕ1, ϕe, ϕ2 0.0, 0.03, 0.05 housing transaction costs
η 1.01 elasticity of labor
δ 0 depreciation of housing
µ ,ν 0.3, 0.03 share of capital and housing
X 1.05 markup
θ 0.75 probability of the fixed price
4.2 Estimation
4.2.1 Monetary Policy
For monetary policy, I assume that the nominal interest rate responds to past inflation and
past output through the following Taylor Rule, which is a log-linearization of Equation
(19):
Rˆt = αRRˆt−1 + (1− αR)
(
(1 + αpi) pˆit−1 + αY Yˆt−1
)
+ εˆR,t. (20)
I estimate the parameters of the Taylor Rule using the OLS method.
Table 2: Taylor Rule: Estimation using OLS
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Statistic
Rˆt−1 0.84 0.035 23.63
Yˆt−1 0.011 0.008 1.35
pˆit−1 0.264 0.06 4.19
Constant 0.024 0.045 0.5
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Monetary policy makers respond to past inflation and output through a lagged interest
rate. The coefficients are estimated: R̂t = 0.84
(0.03)
R̂t−1 + 0.26
(0.06)
pit−1 + 0.011
(0.008)
ŷt−1.12 Hence
Equation (20) can be written as
R̂t = 0.84
(0.03)
R̂t−1 + 0.16
(
1.5
(0.06)
pit−1 + 0.069
(0.008)
ŷt−1
)
. (21)
4.2.2 Estimation
The crucial parameter for the model is the elasticity of substitution of housing for
consumption. Here, I discuss two estimates of this parameter. The first involves a co-
integration method. The second uses minimum distance estimation between model and
data impulse responses.
Using NIPA data, I estimate this elasticity of intratemporal substitution, ε, to be 0.19
(Song (2009)) using a co-integrating method. I find a significant estimate of this elasticity
of substitution, ε, to be 0.19. The key point for this significance is the time period of
the data. The sample period is important because different sample periods provide dif-
ferent significance of statistical analysis. The sample period of NIPA data is from 1970
through 2009, which is different from the samples from 1947 to 2001 as in Piazzesi et al.
(2007). The relative price is the ratio of the price index of housing services to the price
index of nondurable consumption. I use co-integration approach to parameter estimation.
The complementarity, or the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between housing and
consumption is estimated at 0.19, 0.19 and 0.18 through DOLS, CCR and FMOLS, respec-
tively. Piazzesi et al. (2005) also use NIPA data to estimate the parameter of the elasticity
of substitution using co-integration method, which, however, is not significant statistically.
The data in their paper is used in two different categories: long sample periods (1936-
2001) and post-war sample periods (1947-2001). The results are different based on the the
beginning period of 1936 and 1947. However, the periods from 1970 through 2009 as in
Song (2009) significantly provide co-integration trends. This finding is consistent with the
results of Flavin and Nakagawa (2004) who apply GMM to the PSID. They estimate the
EIS at 0.13.
For robustness, instead of using co-integrating method through which I identified com-
plementarity, I broadly follow the methodology of Iacoviello (2005) in that I use minimum
12Following Equation (2), the coefficients are transformed into (1− αR) (1 + αpi) = 0.26→ αpi = 0.26(1−αR)−
1, (1− αR)αY = 0.011→ αY = 0.011(1−αR) .
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distance estimation using macro data from 1970:Q1 to 2008:Q4, such as the Federal Fund
Rate (fedfunds), inflation ( GDP deflator), house prices (CMHPI), and real GDP (GDPC1).
However, this estimation still differs from Iacoviello (2005) in substantive ways. First, I use
a different time period. Second, I add two more structural parameters: 1) the elasticity of
intratemporal substitution, ε, and 2) risk aversion, ς.
The EIS, ε, is estimated at 0.592 with a standard error of 0.053, thus providing strong
support of preferences over housing and consumption for nonseparability and complemen-
tarity. I estimate the empirical impulse responses using the VAR method. The Choleski
ordering is the Fed Fund Rate, inflation, house prices and the output gap. The distance
function is f (b) = IRFM (b) − IRFD, where IRFM (b) is the impulse responses obtained
from the model, IRFD is the data responses from the VAR, and b is the vector of pa-
rameters (ε, σ, σu, σj , σa, ru, rj , ra, a,m1,m2). There exist solutions to the minimization of
Jt(b) = MIN
b
[
f
(314×1)
(b)T Φ
(314×314)
f
(314×1)
(b)
]
,where Φ = W
314×314
Ω−1
314×314
, where Ω−1 is the
inverse matrix of the sample variance of the IRFs.
Table 3: Estimation
Parameter Value STD.e Parameter Value STD.e
ε =elasticity of substitution 0.592 0.053 φpi = autoregressivepi 0.629 0.043
ς =curvature 2.317 0.357 φ = autoregressivej 0.885 0.017
a =share of wage 0.553 0.046 φa = autoregressivea 0.177 0.1
me = loan− to− valuee 0.412 0.066 σA = stdeva 9.195 3.5
m2 = loan− to− value2 0.861 0.02 σj = stdevj 0.021 1.64
σR = stdevR 0.24 0.009 σpi = stdevpi 0.154 0.024
5 Results
5.1 The Issue of Separable Preferences with housing transaction costs
In Figure 3, I examine the effect of housing transaction costs on aggregate consumption
to an exogenous positive house price shock of 1 percent under separable preferences. A
persistent change in house prices is generated by a common, exogenous shock to j that
affects all households. In this first example, I set ε =1 to eliminate complementarity
between housing and consumption. Thus utility is separable in housing and non-housing
consumption. Panel (A) shows results when there are no transaction costs. In contrast,
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Panel (B) introduces transaction costs. The triangled, squared, and circled lines are the
impulse responses of aggregate consumption to the increase in house prices. The house
loan-to-value ratios of those three lines for entrepreneurs and constrained households are
set to (0.1 percent, 0.1 percent), (45 percent, 30 percent) and (89 percent, and 55 percent),
respectively.
Figure 3: Separability and Proportional Transaction Costs
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Panel (A) is a replication of Iacoviello (2005) with his log utility function. As in his
paper, there are no housing transaction costs. With loan-to-value ratios of 89 percent for
entrepreneurs and 55 percent of constrained households, aggregate consumption rises by
0.24 percent after an 1 percent increase in house prices. In this consumption response,
the loan-to-value ratios are critical factors, which make the model successful, so that the
response matches the data within the 90 percent confidence intervals. The other loan-
to-value ratios do not induce effective co-movement between housing and consumption.
Hence, the co-movement between house prices and consumption depends on the loan-to-
value ratio.
In order to see the effects of proportional housing transaction costs on aggregate con-
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sumption, I compare the circled line in Panel (A) with that in Panel (B). The circled line
in Panel (B) shows the consumption response with the presence of transaction costs of 5
percent and 3 percent for constrained households and entrepreneurs respectively.13
Critically, once we introduce empirically plausible levels of transaction costs, the posi-
tive consumption response to a rise in house prices disappears. Transaction costs dominate
and dampen the effects of loan-to-value ratios so that aggregate consumption no longer
increases following a rise in house prices. The aggregate consumption response is severely
affected by transaction costs. In other words, housing transaction costs nullify the effect
of loan-to-value ratios on consumption. Hence, separable utility function between housing
and consumption in this model, cannot generate a co-movement between house prices and
consumption when housing transactions costs are introduced.14
5.2 Complementarity between Housing and Consumption
Figure 4 resolves the problem caused by housing transaction costs in Figure 3. The so-
lution relies on the introduction of nonseparable preferences over housing and consumption.
Since the extent of non-separability of preferences is jointly determined by the elasticity of
intratemporal substitution, ε, and curvature, ς, the parameters are now jointly estimated.
The estimates of ε and ς are 0.59 and 2.3, respectively. As before, a rise in house prices
is generated by a shock to housing demand, j, common across households. The house
loan-to-value ratios, for entrepreneurs and constrained households, are set to 41 percent
and 86 percent, respectively.
Panel (A) shows that complementarity induces a positive aggregate consumption re-
sponse following a positive house price shock of 1 percent. When housing transaction costs
are set to 5 percent and 3 percent for constrained households and entrepreneurs, respec-
tively, the consumption response rises to 0.31 percent, which falls within the 90 percent
confidence intervals of the data.
Panel (B) examines the sensitivity of my results with respect to housing transaction
costs, fixing the loan-to-value ratios for entrepreneurs and constrained households to 41
13In the sensitivity, 6 percent is applied.
14Empirical impulse responses come from the estimated VAR using the data of federal fund rate, real
house prices, real personal consumption expenditures, real GDP and inflation. Inflation is the change in
GDP deflator. All variables are already de-trended by BP filter and taken by logarithm. The data, data
transformation, and the order in the VAR are the same as in Iacoviello (2005).
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percent and 86 percent, respectively.
Figure 4: Complementarity with Transaction Costs and Loan-to-Values
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VAR + 90% c.i.
As transaction costs increase to 6 percent for all agents, the aggregate consumption response
at the impact date falls to 0.29 percent. Consumption soars when transaction costs are
close to zero with the consumption response climbing to 0.57 percent, which causes the
response to lie outside the 90 percent confidence intervals. In other words, when there are
no transaction costs, the consumption response becomes implausibly large.15
15The confidence intervals come from the VAR, estimated from the data for federal fund rate, inflation,
house prices and output from 1970 Q1 to 2008 Q4. These series are the same as in Iacoviello (2005), but
for different time periods.
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5.3 Consumption Across Households
In Figure 5 I investigate how an 1 percent increase in house prices affects consump-
tion of different households as transaction costs vary. There are two types of households:
constrained and unconstrained. Aggregate consumption data on these types of households
are taken from Consumer Expenditure Surveys from 1984:Q1 to 2008:Q4. Constrained
households are assumed to be young households (below 35 years old) whose housing pur-
chase is typically highly leveraged, as in Flavin and Yamashita (2002). On the other hand,
unconstrained households are assumed to be relatively old households (over 35 years old).
The model’s parameters for complementarity and loan to value ratios for entrepreneurs
and constrained households are set to 0.59, 0.41 and 0.86, respectively.
Figure 5: Consumption across Households
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When experiencing an one percent exogenous increase in house prices, the gains in
house prices are not equally distributed across the heterogeneous households. In other
words, the two types of households react differently to a shock in house prices. Generally,
as transaction costs fall, the consumption response is likely to rise. A key result of the
model is that constrained households are more likely to be responsive to a change in house
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prices than unconstrained households.
Panel (A) shows the consumption response of unconstrained households. Initially, un-
constrained households increase consumption by around 0.2 percent. Moreover, the slope
of their consumption response is generally flat. Interestingly, their consumption response
does negligibly vary when facing different transaction costs. Therefore, transaction costs
do not significantly affect the consumption responses of unconstrained households. The
consumption response for constrained households is illustrated in Panel (B). Overall, con-
strained households are substantially more responsive to the increase in house prices than
unconstrained households. In fact, as transaction costs decrease, the consumption response
rises to 0.5 percent, 0.66 percent and 0.81 percent. Contrary to unconstrained households,
transaction costs are a significant factor for credit-constrained households.
The implication is as follows. Suppose there is a rise in house prices. The marginal
propensity of consumption (MPC) out of gains in house prices for constrained households
is larger than that for unconstrained households. This difference in the MPC across house-
holds leads to a change in overall aggregate consumption. Constrained households are
likely to use their increase in housing collateral value to finance an increase in consumption
that exceeds the house price increase.
5.4 The Effect of Elasticity of Intertemporal substitution on Consump-
tion across Households
Figure 6 illustrates how an 1 percent increase in house prices affect consumption
across heterogeneous households with respect to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
σ = 1/ς. The consumption response to an 1 percent increase in house prices is displayed
with respect to ς. Transaction costs and loan-to-values for entrepreneurs and constrained
households are set to 3 percent, 5 percent, 41 percent and 86 percent, respectively. I applied
the parameter values of 2.3, 6 and 10 for ς in order to consider the case when risk aversion
is normal, high and very high for unconstrained households (Panel A) and for constrained
households (Panel B). The EIS is held fixed at 0.59.
Panel (A) displays the effect of risk aversion on consumption of unconstrained house-
holds. The consumption responses facing different values of risk aversion are negligibly
different. Risk aversion does not significantly affect the consumption decision for uncon-
strained households.
Panel (B) displays the effect of risk aversion on consumption of constrained households.
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Figure 6: Consumption sensitivity facing different risk aversion, σ
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Generally, higher risk aversion induces lower initial consumption. When ς = 10, the initial
rise in the consumption of constrained households seen at lower levels of risk aversion is
completely overturned. When risk aversion is 2.3, the consumption response to an 1 percent
rise in house prices is 0.5 percent.
Overall, risk aversion affects consumption decisions of constrained households. Even a
positive house price shock can lead to a fall in consumption when risk aversion is high, that
is when households are unwilling to substitute consumption inter-temporally. The effect of
a low elasticity of intertemproal substitution offsets the positive effect of house prices.
6 Results for Monetary Policy
This section studies the effect of interest rate shocks on housing and consumption. My
first result illustrates how changes in ε, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
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housing and consumption, affects the effective degree of risk aversion across households.
This leads to different consumption responses in response to an increase in interest rates.
Figure 7 shows a cumulative consumption loss across households after an 1 percent in-
crease in interest rates for benchmark. Panel (A) is the aggregate cumulative consumption
response to tighter monetary policy. Aggregate consumption falls to 1.92 percent initially.
Panel (B) shows that an increase in interest rates decreases consumption for both con-
strained and unconstrained households. However, this decrease is larger for constrained
households.
Figure 7: Cumulative Consumption Loss responding to a Rise in the Interest Rate
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Figure 8 shows the case when the degree of complementarity, ε, is stronger (lower value
and bold lines) than the benchmark. Aggregate consumption further falls in response to
the increase in interest rates with the stronger complementarity. For constrained house-
holds, the increase in the interest rate with the stronger complementarity induces them to
significantly decrease consumption. Since they are constrained by collateral and an increase
in the interest rate reduces the values of their collateral, consumption falls by more with
stronger complementarity. A negative shock induces them to be more risk averse, so that
their consumption loss further decreases to 5.38 percent compared to the benchmark. The
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stronger complementarity effect on consumption of unconstrained households is different
from that of constrained households. Unconstrained households are not significantly sensi-
tive to an increase in interest rates because they are not constrained by housing collateral,
and they can initially benefit from more interest amount as lenders. Stronger comple-
mentarity magnifies the effect of interest rates, so that the gap between two consumption
responses across heterogeneous households widens.
Figure 8: Cumulative Consumption Loss responding to a Rise in the Interest Rate
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In Figure 8, the dotted lines show the case in which the degree of complementarity,
ε, become weaker (higher value) than the benchmark. For constrained households, the
precautionary saving motive is not as strong as in the bold lines. The negative interest effect
on consumption for constrained households becomes smaller with weaker complementarity.
The higher degree of substitutability within a period of time make constrained households
less effectively risk averse, so that they decrease consumption by less compared to the
benchmark. The aggregate cumulative consumption loss is only 2.64 percent at impact.
Unconstrained households, however, become more sensitive to the increase in the interest
rate. Overall, the disparity of consumption across heterogeneous households is lessened.
We now study the effect of different loan-to-value ratios on the sensitivity of the econ-
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omy to monetary policy. Figure 9 shows the effects of annual one percent increase in
the interest rate on aggregate consumption. Panel (A) and Panel (B) are the benchmark
based on the estimated or calibrated parameter values: curvature, ς, and complementarity,
ε, are set to 2.3 and 0.592, respectively. Loan-to-values for entrepreneurs and constrained
households are set to 42 percent and 86 percent, respectively. As already seen, a rise in
the interest rate serves to significantly decrease house prices and consumption as shown in
Panel (A) and Panel (B). The decrease in consumption is larger for constrained households.
Figure 9: Loan-to-Values Facing a Rise in the Interest Rate
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Figure 10 displays the negative effect of loan-to-values on house prices and consumption
facing tighter monetary policy. As loan-to-value ratios increase to 80 percent and 91 percent
for entrepreneurs and constrained households, house prices and aggregate consumption
further decrease. Importantly, higher loan-to-value ratios increase the volatility of house
prices caused by changes in monetary policy. Specifically, an 1 percent rise in interest rates
now decreases house prices to 1.31 percent at impact. They then reach a 4.59 percent loss in
cumulative way. House prices become even more volatile. Furthermore, the increase in the
interest rate now leads households to decrease consumption by more. The initial cumulative
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consumption losses across constrained households and unconstrained households is 4.59
percent and 1.02 percent, respectively. This cumulative loss of consumption to an increase
in interest rates is significantly larger for constrained households, and the gap between the
two impulse responses widens as loan-to-value ratios increase.
Figure 10: Loan-to-Values Facing a Rise in the Interest Rate
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7 Conclusion
This paper explores the implications of shocks to housing demand and monetary policy
in a model where period utility is nonseparable in housing and non-housing consump-
tion, and where housing sales involve transaction costs. When housing transaction costs
are introduced into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models where period utility is
additively separable in housing and consumption, such models fail to reproduce the co-
movement between these series that is observed in the data. By eliminating the log utility
assumption and allowing for complementarity in preferences, I develop a model that can
accommodate the realism of housing transaction costs while retaining the co-movement
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between housing and consumption.
My model generates differing elasticities of response across households following aggre-
gate shocks. Following changes in both house prices and interest rates, the consumption
response of credit-constrained households is greater than that of unconstrained households.
I trace this differing responsiveness in consumption to the house loan-to-value ratios char-
acterizing credit-constrained households. Loan-to-value ratios amplify the effect of changes
in interest rates on consumption especially for credit-constrained households. I also find
that the differences widen with the degree of complementarity between housing and con-
sumption.
Following a rise in house prices, the net worth of credit-constrained households in-
creases, which boosts their access to credit. This, in turn, allows constrained households
to raise their spending on consumption and housing. Moreover the resulting rise in hous-
ing demand leads to a further increase in house prices. While transaction costs abate
this process somewhat, the fundamental co-movement between housing and consumption
persists.
In ongoing research, I am using a related framework to examine the role of financial
frictions in determining household consumption. Since down-payments associated with
mortgages are determined by banks, house loan-to-value ratios are, to some extent, exoge-
nous for households. Thus, I develop a model where changes in loan-to-value ratios serve
as financial shocks and use it to investigate the effect of such shocks on consumption and
house prices. In particular, I study how constrained households react to financial innova-
tion that lowered loan-to-value ratios.
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